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Introduction
A look at post-transitional societies in recent history shows that as
part of the bargain for political change, many nations have acquiesced to
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an amnesty' for perpetrators of past serious human rights abuses. In the
last two decades, amnesty measures have existed in eleven Latin American
countries, including Argentina, Brazil, Chile, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti,
Honduras, Nicaragua, Peru, Suriname, and Uruguay.2 Outside Latin
America, South Africa and Cambodia, for example, have also enacted
amnesties for perpetrators who committed serious abuses during the previ-
ous regimes' rule.3 While the amnesties use various modalities,4 each gives
rise to the same question. Namely, what effect does a domestic amnesty
have on the capacity of States with no connection to the offense to prose-
cute alleged perpetrators of serious human rights violations who are hiding
behind the amnesty's shield? As the recent case of General Pinochet's
requested extradition from Great Britain to Spain illustrates, this question
surfaces not only in academic debates, but also in practice. 5
Rather than explore the intricacies of various amnesty measures or
study a particular case, this Article develops an analytical framework for
answering the question whether States with no connection to the given
offense may prosecute the alleged offender despite the fact that he received
an amnesty from the State where the offense took place. This question can
only be answered after determining whether the prosecuting State has a
sufficient jurisdictional basis for proceeding against the alleged offender
and, if so, whether the amnesty measure nevertheless disables prosecution.
Section I argues that the answer to the first question turns on whether the
offensive conduct in the case at hand gives rise to universal jurisdiction,
1. Norman Weisman described amnesty as "an act of sovereign power granting for-
giveness for a past offense...." Norman Weisman, A History and Discussion of Amnesty,
4 COLUM. HUM. RTs. L. REv. 529 (1972). He observed that "[tihe history of amnesty
dates back to 404 B.C., when Thrasybulus, an Athenian general, forbade any punish-
ment of Athenian citizens for political acts committed before the expulsion of the
tyrants." Id. at 530.
2. See Douglass Cassel, Lessons from the Americas: Guidelines for International
Response to Amnesties for Atrocities, 59 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 197, 200-01 (1996); see
also Alejandro M. Garro, Nine Years of Transition to Democracy in Argentina: Partial Fail-
ure or Qualified Success?, 31 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1, 10-11 (1993) (describing
amnesty and similar measures in Latin America).
3. See, e.g., Diane F. Orentlicher, International Criminal Law and the Cambodian
Killing Fields, 3 ILSAJ. IrLr'l & COMP. L. 705, 708-09, 711 (1997).
4. While the amnesty measures generally provide a shield to accountability, the
South African model, which couples amnesty granting with truth seeking, allows the
amnesty-granting body to withhold an amnesty from a person if, because of the egre-
gious nature of the offense, the grant of an amnesty would not serve the objective of
reconciliation. See Diane F. Orentlicher, Swapping Amnesty for Peace and the Duty to
Prosecute Human Rights Crimes, 3 ILSAJ. ITr'L & CoMP. L. 713, 714 (1997); see also
MARTHA MINow, BETwEEN VENGEANCE AND FORGIVENESS 55-57 (1998) (describing the
South African amnesty model).
5. Of course, General Pinochet's case raises not only amnesty issues, immunity
being guaranteed by the Chilean 1978 Amnesty Decree and the parliamentary immunity
provided by the Chilean Constitution of 1990, but also the issue of head of state immu-
nity. See Regina v. Bartle, [2000] 1 App. Cas. 61 (1998) (appeal taken from Q.B. Div'l
Ct.). See generally Amnesty International, United Kingdom: Universal Jurisdiction and
Absence of Immunity for Crimes Against Humanity (visited Mar. 24, 1999) <http://
www.amnesty.org.uk/news/pinochet/report.html>.
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assuming arguendo that no other jurisdictional basis could apply.6 Sec-
tion II argues that the answer to the second question depends on whether
the amnesty measure is valid under international human rights law. The
relevant consideration in assessing the validity of the amnesty measure is
whether international law requires prosecution for any of the offenses to
which the measure extends. If so, the amnesty measure cannot be consid-
ered valid on the international plane with respect to those offenses. In con-
clusion, Section III suggests an analytical framework for the discrete
enquiries that are necessary in determining the effect of a domestic
amnesty on the ability of foreign States to prosecute alleged perpetrators of
serious human rights violations.
I. The Validity of the Exercise of Universal Jurisdiction
A. Prelude: Erga Omnes Obligations and Legal Interests of States
In general, States have granted amnesties in situations of internal con-
flict involving mass violations of human rights.7 Yet basic human rights,
whether protected by conventions or custom, impose upon States an obli-
gation not to violate them. In common understanding, States owe human
rights obligations to all other States, or erga omnes.8 In a well-known dic-
tum, the International Court of Justice in the Barcelona Traction case stated
that erga omnes obligations derive, for example,
from the outlawing of acts of aggression, and of genocide, as also from the
principles and rules concerning the basic rights of the human person,
including protection from slavery and racial discrimination. Some of the
corresponding rights of protection have entered into the body of general
international law; others are conferred by international instruments of a uni-
6. The other bases for extraterritorial jurisdiction are (i) the nationality principle
(entails jurisdiction over acts committed by a State's nationals abroad), (ii) the protective
principle (acts against a State's security interests committed by aliens abroad), and (iii)
the passive personality principle (acts against a State's nationals committed by aliens
abroad). See generally Roman Boed, United States Legislative Approach to Extraterritorial
Jurisdiction in Connection with Terrorism, in I INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW: PROCEDURAL
AND ENFORCEMENT MECHANISMS 145, 146-50 (M. Cherif Bassiouni ed., 2d ed. 1999) (dis-
cussing these bases for extraterritorial jurisdiction).
7. See, e.g., Cassel, supra note 2, at 197-98.
8. Claudia Annacker identified an erga omnes obligation as a duty with a "non-
bilaterlizable structure." Claudia Annacker, The Legal Regime of Erga Omnes Obligations
in International Law, 46 AusrluANJ. PUB. INT'L L. 131, 136 (1994). An erga onnes obliga-
tion "can only be fulfilled or breached vis-a-vis all States belonging to a community...
of all States which are bound by a norm of treaty or customary international law ....
Id. (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted). Clearly, human rights obligations have
this character. If a State breaches human rights protected by a treaty to which it is a
party or by custom, that State breaches its express (in case of a treaty) or implicit (in
case of custom) promise to protect those rights vis-a-vis all other States similarly bound.
The injury from the breach thus reaches all States in the community. See LAum HAN-
NIKAINEN, PEREMPTORY NoRMs (Jus COGENS) IN INTERNATIONAL LAw 282-83 (1988) (identi-
fying basic human rights obligations as owed to the community of States); see also
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAw OF THE UNITED STATES § 702 cmt. o
(1987) (noting that violations of certain customary human rights obligations "are viola-
tions of obligations to all other states") [hereinafter RESTATEMENT (THIRD)].
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versal or quasi-universal character. 9
The Court said that these erga omnes obligations are "[b]y their very
nature.., the concern of all States. In view of the importance of the rights
involved, all States can be held to have a legal interest in their
protection . ... "10
This raises a question as to the effect of a State's legal interest created
by breach of an erga omnes obligation.'1 Upon consideration of this ques-
tion, Oscar Schachter concluded that where a party to a multilateral treaty
breached its obligatio erga omnes under the treaty, any other party to that
treaty could seek redress for the breach, even if that other State sustained
no material injury from the breach and the breach did not affect its nation-
als. 12 In effect, under such a view, the legal interest that flows from the
breach of an erga omnes obligation enables actio popularis. 13 However, pro-
ceeding as actio popularis depends on whether the breaching State con-
sented to the jurisdiction of the tribunal from which redress is sought.14
The legal interest that other States have as a result of an obligatio erga
omnes breach does not overcome the breaching State's refusal to accept a
tribunal's jurisdiction. 15 This control over jurisdiction tempers the practi-
cal effect of the legal interest that flows from the breach of an erga omnes
9. Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Co., Ltd. (Beig. v. Spain), 1970 I.CJ. 3, 32
(Feb. 5) (citation omitted).
10. Id. Lauri Hannikainen found that in addition to the views of the International
Court of Justice, the work of the International Law Commission and the writings of
scholars support "the view that there exist obligations of States towards the international
community of States in the observance of which all States have a legal interest." HAN.
NIKVaNEN, supra note 8, at 274, 276.
11. Hannikainen observed that while the prevailing view is that "there exist obliga-
tions towards the international community of States in the vindication of which all
States have a legal interest," it is uncertain how the vindication of such obligations "can
be realized in contemporary international law." HANNIKAJNEN, supra note 8, at 276.
Hannikainen suggested that vindication of such obligations may be through actio popu-
laris, but stated that "actio popularis can be realized properly only as an exercise of the
right to institute proceedings in international juridical bodies." Id.
12. See OSCAR SCHACHTER, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 209-10
(1991). An erga omnes obligation can arise not only under a treaty, but also under
custom. See Louis HENKIN, INTERNATIONAL LAw: POLITICS AND VALUEs 216-17 (1995)
(stating that customary law of human rights "recognizes the interests of all states in the
human rights of all human beings"); Annacker, supra note 8, at 135 ("An erga omnes
obligation can be an obligation towards all the parties to a multilateral treaty ... , an
obligation vis-d-vis a community of States bound by a rule of regional customary inter-
national law or an obligation towards the international community.").
13. The breach would enable actio popularis at least to the extent that nearly all
States are parties to the treaties that create the erga omnes obligations recognized by the
Barcelona Traction opinion. See SCHACHTER, supra note 12, at 210; see also supra text
accompanying note 9 (noting the sources of erga omnes obligations).
14. See SCHACHTER, supra note 12, at 210-11; Annacker, supra note 8, at 165.
15. See A. J. J. de Hoogh, The Relationship between Jus Cogens, Obligations Erga
Omnes and International Crimes: Peremptory Norms in Perspective, 42 AusTRiAN J. PuB.
INT'L L. 183, 196 (1991) ("1Ilt is obvious that even if a State possesses a legal interest, it
still cannot dispense with the requirement of a jurisdictional link under art. 36 of the
Statute [of the International Court of Justice]."); see also HANNIKAINEN, supra note 8, at
280 ("[I]t appears that actio popularis can be realized only among those parties to the
Statute which have accepted the compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ.").
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obligation. 16
As a further complication, any such legal interest is opposable to the
breaching State, not to its nationals.1 7 Consequently, this legal interest
cannot be the foundation for jurisdiction over individuals. Moreover, in
the Barcelona Traction case, the International Court of Justice discussed
erga omnes obligations in the context of a civil matter between two States18
without reference to criminal jurisdiction.19 Accordingly, erga omnes obli-
gations do not create universal jurisdiction over crimes.20 Therefore, the
validity of the exercise of universal jurisdiction over alleged human rights
violations by individuals cannot be based on a showing that the alleged
violations breach rights that States have an erga omnes obligation to
protect.21
B. Universal Jurisdiction
Instead, the validity of an exercise of universal jurisdiction depends on
whether a treaty or custom recognizes universality as an appropriate juris-
dictional basis for regulating or proscribing the given conduct 22 and
whether it is reasonable to extend jurisdiction to conduct that has no par-
16. See HANNIKAINEN, supra note 8, at 282; SCHACHTER, supra note 12, at 210-11.
17. Restatement (Third), for example, sets out as remedies for violations of human
rights obligations the following:
(1) A state party to an international human rights agreement has, as against any
other state party violating the agreement, the remedies generally available for vio-
lation of an international agreement, as well as any special remedies provided by
the agreement.
(2) Any state may pursue international remedies against any other state for a
violation of the customary international law of human rights.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 8, § 703 (emphasis added) (citation omitted). Any
remedy for a breach of an erga omnes human rights obligation lies against a State, not
against an individual.
18. See Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Co., Ltd. (BeIg. v Spain), 1970 I.CJ. 3
(Feb. 5); see also supra note 10 and accompanying text.
19. See ROSALIYN HIGGINS, PROBLEMS AND PROCESS: INTERNATIONAL LAW AND How WE
USE IT 57 (1994). Higgins noted that the Court's dictum in Barcelona Traction "is often
incorrectly used as authority for more than it can sustain." Id. Higgins continued:
It is spoken of... as if the Court was affirming universal jurisdiction in respect
of each of these offences. Of course, the Court was doing nothing of the kind.
Its dictum was made in the context not of the assertion of jurisdiction but of an
examination of the law relating to diplomatic protection.
Id.
20. See id.; see also SCHAcHTER, supra note 12, at 269.
21. But see Amnesty International, supra note 5, sec. II.B ("The legal interest erga
omnes permits any state to exercise universal jurisdiction over persons suspected of
committing crimes against humanity."); Kenneth C. Randall, Universal Jurisdiction
Under International Law, 66 TEx. L. REv. 785, 830 (1988) (arguing that the concept of
erga omnes obligations "may subsidiarily support the right of all states to exercise uni-
versal jurisdiction over.., individual offenders [who violate rights that States are under
an erga omnes obligation to protect]").
22. See HIGGINS, supra note 19, at 58 ("The right to exercise jurisdiction under the
universality principle can stem either from a treaty of universal or quasi-universal scope,
or from acceptance under general international law."); see also STEVEN R. RATNER &
JASON S. ABRAMS, ACCOUNTABILITY FOR HUMAN RIGHTS ATRocInEs IN INTERNATIONAL LAW:
BEYOND THE NUREMBERG LEGACY 141 (1997).
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ticular connection with the prosecuting State.23 Universality has been
accepted as a valid basis for the exercise of jurisdiction in cases of extrater-
ritorial conduct considered to be of universal concern by the international
community.24 The assumption behind the universality principle of extra-
territorial jurisdiction is that the prosecuting State acts on behalf of all
States in suppressing conduct deemed abhorrent or harmful to the interna-
tional community.25
Historically, it has been accepted that piracy 2 6 and slave trade27 con-
23. Restatement (Third) lists, inter alia, the following factors as relevant in determin-
ing whether exercise of jurisdiction over a person or activity is reasonable:
(c) the character of the activity to be regulated, the importance of regulation to
the regulating state, the extent to which other states regulate such activities, and
the degree to which the desirability of such regulation is generally accepted;
(d) the existence of justified expectations that might be protected or hurt by the
regulation;
(e) the importance of the regulation to the international political, legal, or eco-
nomic system;
() the extent to which the regulation is consistent with the traditions of the
international system;
(g) the extent to which another state may have an interest in regulating the activ-
ity; and
(h) the likelihood of conflict with regulation by another state.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 8, § 403(2); see also LAIN CAMERON, THE PROTECTIVE
PRINCIPLE OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JURISDICTION 333-37 (1994) (discussing the appli-
cation of the rule of reasonableness); HENKIN, supra note 12, at 242-46 (discussing the
principle of reasonableness); RATNER & ABRAMS, supra note 22, at 141 (stating that
under the rule of reasonableness, "even where a state enjoys a recognized basis for
asserting jurisdiction, its exercise of that jurisdiction will not be proper if another state
has a more profound interest in exercising jurisdiction over the offender").
24. Restatement (Third), for example, states that "[a] state has jurisdiction to define
and prescribe punishment for certain offenses recognized by the community of nations as
of universal concern.... ." RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 8, § 404 (emphasis added).
25. See, e.g., M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL ExTRADITION" UNITED STATES LAW
AND PRACTICE 298 (2d ed. 1987) (identifying, as the core of universality, conduct that
.constitutes a violation against mankind") ("Any state, if it captures the offender, may
prosecute and punish that person on behalf of the world community .... [Universal
jurisdiction] allows states to protect universal values and the interests of mankind."); IAN
BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAw 304 (4th ed. 1990) (describing
universality-based jurisdiction as "jurisdiction over acts of non-nationals where the cir-
cumstances, including the nature of the crime, justify the repression of some types of
crime as a matter of international public policy" (emphasis added)); HIGGINS, supra note
19, at 58 (noting that States apply universality to conduct which they treat as criminal
and which "they perceive also as an attack upon international order"); Christopher C.
Joyner, Arresting Impunity: The Case for Universal Jurisdiction in Bringing War Criminals
to Accountability, 59 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 153, 165 (1996) ("This principle is
grounded in the assumption that the prosecuting state is acting on behalf of all states.");
F. A. Mann, The Doctrine of Jurisdiction in International Law, 111 RECUEIL DES COUPS 1,
95 (1/1964) (stating that the exercise of universal jurisdiction "is founded upon the
accused's attack upon the international order as a whole").
26. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 8, § 404 (listing piracy among offenses
subject to universal jurisdiction); BAssIOUNI, supra note 25, at 298-300; HIGGINS, supra
note 19, at 58; SCHACHTER, supra note 12, at 267; Michael Akehurst, Jurisdiction in Inter-
national Law, 1972-73 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 145, 160; D. W. Bowett, Jurisdiction: Changing
Patterns of Authority over Activities and Resources, 1982 BRIT Y.B. INT'L L. 1, 11; Harvard
Law School Research in International Law, Draft Convention on Jurisdiction with Respect
to Crime, 29 AM. J. INT'L L. 439, 563 (Supp. 1935) ("A State has jurisdiction with respect
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stitute conduct over which any State may exercise jurisdiction. The motiva-
tion for permitting the exercise of jurisdiction by any State over piracy
stemmed from the realization that "[p]iracy may comprise particularly hei-
nous and wicked acts of violence or depredation, which are often commit-
ted indiscriminately against the vessels and nationals of numerous
states."'28 Extension of universal jurisdiction over piracy was justified, in
part, by States' perception that their nationals were at risk of violent
attacks on the high seas where the perpetrators could flee quickly without
the injured parties' State having an opportunity to apprehend them.2 9
Another part of the rationale for extending universal jurisdiction to piracy
was States' appreciation that piracy was a menace to sea transport, an
important means of enabling intercourse between States at the time.30
Therefore, to some extent, piracy threatened the functioning of the interna-
tional community, and empowering any member of that community to
tackle it was a reasonable and practical response to the threat, especially in
view of the perpetrators' easy escape.
By comparison, universal jurisdiction over slave trade on the high seas
appears to have been motivated by States' determination that slave trading
was an activity particularly "worthy of condemnation and international
response," not by any concern that the activity interfered with interstate
intercourse.31 The international community's disgust with certain forms
of conduct, rather than practical reasons, seems to be the principal moti-
vating factor justifying universal jurisdiction in the present era.
Other forms of conduct, such as war crimes,32 apartheid,33 crimes
to any crime committed outside its territory by an alien which constitutes piracy by
international law."); Mann, supra note 25, at 95; Randall, supra note 21, at 791; Hari M.
Osofsky, Note, Domesticating International Criminal Law: Bringing Human Rights Viola-
tors to Justice, 107 YALE LJ. 191, 194 (1997).
27. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 8, § 404 (listing slave trade among
offenses subject to universal jurisdiction); BAssiouNI, supra note 25, at 301; HIGGINS,
supra note 19, at 58; RATNER & ABRAMs, supra note 22, at 141, 144; SCHACHTER, supra
note 12, at 267; Randall, supra note 21, at 798-800.
28. Randall, supra note 21, at 794 (footnotes omitted).
29. See id. at 795.
30. See id.
31. Id. at 800.
32. War crimes refer to grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions and like custom.
See, e.g., RrsTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 8, § 404 (listing war crimes among offenses
subject to universal jurisdiction); GEOFFREY BEST, WAR AND LAV SINCE 1945 165-66
(1994); HIGGINS, supra note 19, at 59; RATHE & ABRAMs, supra note 22, at 143;
SCHACHTER, supra note 12, at 268; Willard B. Cowles, Universality of Jurisdiction Over
War Crimes, 33 CAL. L. REv. 177, 216-18 (1945) ("In the light of practice .... every
independent State has jurisdiction to punish war criminals in its custody regardless of
the nationality of the victim, the time it entered the war, or the place where the offense
was committed."); Lori Fisler Damrosch, Enforcing International Law Through Non-Forci-
ble Measures, 269 RECUEIL DES Coues 9, 218 (1997);Joyner, supra note 25, at 170 ("Every
state under international law thus retains permissible jurisdiction to punish war
criminals, regardless of the nationality of the victim or the offender, or the place where
the offense was committed."); Orentlicher, supra note 3, at 705; Randall, supra note 21,
at 800. But see Bowett, supra note 26, at 12. Derek Bowett argues:
The view that the 1949 Geneva Conventions provide for universal jurisdiction,
though sometimes asserted, is probably incorrect. For the obligation imposed
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against humanity, genocide, and torture, arguably have come within the
States' universal jurisdiction. The remainder of this Section will consider
universal jurisdiction over the last three offenses, crimes against humanity,
genocide, and torture, because they address conduct likely to be included
in the scope of domestic amnesty measures.
1. Universal Jurisdiction over Crimes Against Humanity
Crimes against humanity most recently have been defined in the Stat-
ute of the International Criminal Court adopted by the United Nations
Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an
International Criminal Court in 1998.3 4 Article 7 casts crimes against
humanity as:
any of the following acts when committed as part of a widespread or sys-
temic attack directed against any civilian population, with knowledge of the
attack:
(a) Murder;
(b) Extermination;
(c) Enslavement;
(d) Deportation or forcible transfer of population;
(e) Imprisonment or other severe deprivation of physical liberty in violation
of fundamental rules of international law;
(f) Torture;
(g) Rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, enforced
sterilization, or any other form of sexual violence of comparable gravity;
(h) Persecution against any identifiable group or collectivity on political,
racial, national, ethnic, cultural, religious, gender.... or other grounds that
are universally recognized as impermissible under international law, in con-
nection with any act referred to in this paragraph or any crime within the
jurisdiction of the Court;
(i) Enforced disappearance of persons;
(j) The crime of apartheid;
(k) Other inhumane acts of a similar character intentionally causing great
suffering, or serious injury to body or to mental or physical health.3 5
This detailed encapsulation of crimes against humanity represents the
on all contracting Parties to enact municipal legislation so as to make grave
breaches of the Conventions punishable is not the assertion of a universal juris-
diction but merely the provision of the legislative basis for jurisdiction in the
event that the contracting Party is involved in hostilities as a belligerent.
Bowett, supra note 26, at 12 (footnote omitted).
33. See RATNER & ABRAMs, supra note 22, at 145 (noting that the International Con-
vention on the Suppression of and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid created per-
missive universal jurisdiction for States parties to it, but that universality is not yet an
established basis of jurisdiction in custom with respect to apartheid); see also RESTATE.
MENT (THwiR), supra note 8, § 404 reporters' note 1. But see Bowett, supra note 26, at 12-
13 (arguing that the Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of
Apartheid under which States parties are to prosecute and punish "in accordance with
their jurisdiction" does not create universal jurisdiction over the crime of apartheid).
34. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, U.N. GAOR, 53d Sess., U.N.
Doc. A/CONF.183/9 (1998), reprinted in 39 l.L.M. 999 (1998) [hereinafter ICC Statute].
35. Id. art. 7(1).
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latest evolutionary phase of the concept,3 6 which debuted in the 1945
Charter of the International Military Tribunal for the Trial of Major War
Criminals (IMT). 37 While the catalog of included acts has expanded since
the 1945 definition,3 8 the prohibition of crimes against humanity always
has encompassed acts of a very serious nature aimed at any civilian popu-
lation during an international or internal conflict.3 9
The understanding that universal jurisdiction extends over crimes
against humanity seems well-established in doctrine and State practice. 40
36. See Statute of the International Tribunal, Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant
to Paragraph 2 of Security Council Resolution 808, art. 5, para. 47, at 13, U.N. Doc. S/
25704 (1993) [hereinafter ICTY Report] ("Crimes against humanity were first recog-
nized in the Charter andJudgement of the Nfirnberg Tribunal, as well as Law No. 10 of
the Control Council for Germany."); see also M. Cherif Bassiouni, "Crimes Against
Humanity": The Need for a Specialized Convention, 31 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 457, 463
(1994). But see Amnesty International, supra note 5, sec. L.A (identifying earlier
instances recognizing the concept of crimes against humanity). See generally MICHAEL R.
MARRus, THE NUREMBERG WAR CRIMES TRIAL 1945-46: A DOCUMENTARY HIsToRY 185-88
(1997) (charting how crimes against humanity came to be included in the Nuremberg
Charter).
37. Article 6(c) of the IMT Charter defined crimes against humanity as:
murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, and other inhumane acts
committed against any civilian population, before or during the war, or persecu-
tions on political, racial, or religious grounds in execution of or in connection
with any crime within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, whether or not in viola-
tion of the domestic law of the country where perpetrated.
Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the Euro-
pean Axis Powers and Charter of the International Military Tribunal, Aug. 8, 1945, 59
Stat. 1544, 82 U.N.T.S. 279, reprinted in MARRus, supra note 36, at 52 (footnote omitted).
38. Compare supra note 37 (containing the 1945 definition) with supra text accompa-
nying note 35 (1998 definition). The 1993 Statute of the International Criminal Tribu-
nal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) defines crimes against humanity in article 5 as:
the following crimes when committed in armed conflict, whether international
or internal in character, and directed against any civilian population:
(a) murder;
(b) extermination;
(c) enslavement;
(d) deportation;
(e) imprisonment;
() torture;
(g) rape;
(h) persecutions on political, racial and religious grounds;
(i) other inhumane acts.
ICTY Report, supra note 36, Annex. The 1994 Statute of the International Criminal Tri-
bunal for Rwanda (ICTR) contains the same definition. See International Criminal Tri-
bunal for Rwanda, S.C. Res. 955, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3453d mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/
955 (1994), art. 3, reprinted in 33 L.L.M. 1598 (1994) [hereinafter ICTR Statute].
39. See ICTY Report, supra note 36, 9. 47, at 13; see also ICC Statute, supra note 34,
art. 7(2); L. C. Green, Low-Intensity Conflict and the Law, 3 ILSAJ. INT'L & CoMP. L. 493,
516 (1997) ("Even if we ignore the existence of the two specially created tribunals [ICTY
and ICTRI, it may probably be said that it is now well established that crimes committed
during a low-intensity or non-international armed conflict which amount to crimes
against humanity are ... subject to universal jurisdiction .... " (emphasis added)).
40. As for doctrine, the following authorities, among others, indicate that States have
universal jurisdiction over crimes against humanity: RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 8,
§ 404 reporters' note 1; HIGGINS, supra note 19, at 61, RATNER & ABRAMs, supra note 22,
at 143 ("[C]rimes against humanity today are subject to universal jurisdiction."); Bas-
Cornell International Law Journal
A recent study found that twenty-four States have enacted legislation ena-
bling their courts to exercise universal jurisdiction over crimes against
humanity.41 The same study also noted a number of domestic prosecu-
tions for crimes against humanity where jurisdiction was founded on the
universality principle. 42 The best known of these trials, of course, is that
of Adolf Eichmann in Israel.43
Eichmann was a former Gestapo officer responsible for sending Jews
and others to Nazi concentration camps during the Second World War.44
In 1960, he was abducted from Argentina, where he had been living since
the end of the war.45 Eichmann was brought to Israel where the govern-
ment charged him with crimes against the Jewish people, crimes against
humanity, and war crimes under Israel's Nazis and Nazi Collaborators
(Punishment) Act.4 6 The District Court of Jerusalem found Eichmann
siouni, supra note 36, at 481 ("The duty to prosecute or extradite for 'Crimes Against
Humanity' is founded upon the concept that such offenses are international crimes over
which there exists universal jurisdiction."); Damrosch, supra note 32, at 218 ("Crimes
against humanity assuredly entail universal jurisdiction.. . ."); Green, supra note 39, at
516, 519 ("Since virtually all the breaches committed during [non-international con-
flicts] amount to crimes against humanity..., there is sufficient evidence to support the
contention that all such offenses are subject to universal jurisdiction, so that offenders
may be tried by any country in which they may be found."); Theodor Meron, Interna-
tional Criminalization of Internal Atrocities, 89 AM.J. INT'L L. 554, 569 (1995) ("It is now
widely accepted that crimes against humanity are subject to universal jurisdiction."
(citation omitted)); Orentlicher, supra note 3, at 705; Randall, supra note 21, at 800;
Steven R. Ratner, The Schizophrenias of International Criminal Law, 33 TEx. INT'L LJ. 237,
255 (1998).
41. See Amnesty International, supra note 5, sec. II.B (citing the relevant domestic
legal provisions).
42. See id.
43. See Attorney Gen. of Isr. v. Eichmann, 36 I.L.R. 277 (Isr. 1962). For a descrip-
tion of the trial, see HANNAH ARENDT, EICHMANN IN JERUSALEM: A REPORT ON THE BANALITY
OF EVIL (1963).
44. See generally A. Munkman, Eichmann Case: Summary, 36 I.L.R. 5, 5-7 (1968);
ARENDT, supra note 43 (describing Eichmann's war-time activities).
45. See Munkman, supra note 44, at 5-6 (describing the 1960 abduction).
46. See id. at 7-8 (reproducing the relevant parts of the law); Randall, supra note 21,
at 811 (noting the charges). The indictment against Eichmann contained fifteen counts,
including that he
... caused the killing of millions of Jews in his capacity as head of the Gestapo
Department . . . in Berlin responsible for the physical extermination of the
Jews ....
... placed many millions of Jews in living conditions calculated to bring about
their physical destruction-in forced labour camps, ghettos, transit camps, and
transportation under cruel and inhumane conditions....
... caus[ed] serious physical and mental harm to millions of Jews by enslave-
ment, starvation, deportation and persecution and by detention in ghettos,
transit camps and concentration camps in conditions designed to cause their
degradation, deprivation of their rights as human beings, and to suppress them
and cause them inhumane sufferings and torture ....
... devis[ed] ... measures to prevent childbearing amongJews in Germany and
occupied territories ... and devis[ed] measures for the sterilization of the off-
spring of mixed marriages.
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guilty of the crimes charged and sentenced him to death.47 The Israeli
Supreme Court affirmed.48
With respect to Israel's assertion of jurisdictional competence over
crimes that Eichmann, an alien, committed outside Israel (which at the
time of their commission did not exist as a State), the Supreme Court of
Israel stated:
[T]here is full justification for applying here the principle of universal juris-
diction since the international character of 'crimes against humanity' (in the
wide meaning of the term) dealt with in this case is no longer in doubt,
while the unprecedented extent of their injurious and murderous effects is
not to be disputed at the present time. In other words, the basic reason for
which international law recognizes the right of each State to exercise such
jurisdiction in piracy offences-notwithstanding the fact that its own sover-
eignty does not extend to the scene of the commission of the offence (the
high seas) and the offender is a national of another State or is state-
less-applies with even greater force to the above-mentioned crimes.49
Upon thus justifying universal jurisdiction over crimes against
humanity, the Court concluded:
Not only do all the crimes attributed to the appellant [Eichmann] bear an
international character, but their harmful and murderous effects were so
embracing and widespread as to shake the international community to its
very foundations. The State of Israel therefore was entitled, pursuant to the
principle of universal jurisdiction and in the capacity of a guardian of inter-
national law and an agent for its enforcement, to try the appellant.50
Even prior to the Eichmann case, some States relied on universal juris-
diction to extend their jurisdictional competence over extraterritorial acts
by aliens that amount to crimes against humanity. Randall surveyed cases
... [caused] the murder, extermination, enslavement, starvation and deporta-
tion of civilian Jewish populations in Germany, the Axis countries and the occu-
pied areas ....
... [caused] persecution of Jews on national, racial, religious and political
grounds.
* . .[caused] spoliation of the property of Jews in Germany and in Axis and
occupied and de facto controlled territories ....
... caus[ed] the ill-treatment, deportation and murder of Jewish inhabitants of
States occupied by Germany and other Axis States.
... [committed] crimes against humanity in [his] capacity as officer in charge of
the 'evacuation' of civilians: deporting more than half a million Polish civilians
during the period from 1940 to 1942; deporting more than 14,000 Slovenes in
1941; deporting tens of thousands of gypsies to extermination camps in Ger-
man-occupied regions in Eastern Europe, deporting 100 children of the village
of Lidice, in Czechoslovakia, to Poland and their murder there.
Munkman, supra note 44, at 8-9.
47. See Attorney Gen. of Isr. v. Eichmann, 36 I.L.R. 18, 273-76 (Isr. D.C.Jm. 1961).
48. See Eichmann, 36 I.L.R. at 342 (Isr. 1962).
49. Id. at 299.
50. Id. at 304. While commentators generally view Israel's exercise of universal
jurisdiction in this case as justified, see, e.g., Mann, supra note 25, at 95 n.188, Bowett
opined that "the exercise of jurisdiction by Israel in the Eichmann case stands out as
highly unusual, and probably unfounded." Bowett, supra note 26, at 12 (footnote
omitted).
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illustrative of early post-World War II recognition by U.S. and British mili-
tary tribunals that war crimes and crimes against humanity were subject to
the universality principle.5 1 Recently, in connection with the conflicts in
the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, several States initiated criminal pro-
ceedings against aliens present in their territories for the alleged commis-
sion of extraterritorial crimes, including acts within the ambit of crimes
against humanity.5 2 Thus, it is tenable to suggest that a State's exercise of
jurisdiction over an offense correctly characterized as a crime against
humanity would be perceived as valid even where the offense was commit-
ted by aliens abroad and the State lacked any link to it.
2. Universal Jurisdiction over the Crime of Genocide
The 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime
of Genocide defined the crime of genocide for the first time.5 3 Before this
Convention, humanitarian law prohibited some of the acts included in it,
but that law was limited to acts committed during a war.54 The Genocide
Convention expressly applies to included acts committed during war or
peace.5 5 The Convention defines genocide as:
any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in
part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such:
(a) Killing members of the group;
(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;
(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring
about its physical destruction in whole or in part;
(d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;
(e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.5 6
51. See Randall, supra note 21, at 807-10 (discussing In re List, 11 Trials War Crim.
757 (U.S. Mil. Trib.-Nuremberg 1948); Almelo Trial, 1 L. Rep. Trials War Crim. 35 (Brit.
Mil. Ct.-Almelo 1945); Zyklon B Case, 1 L. Rep. Trials War Crim. 93 (Brit. Mil. Ct.-
Hamburg 1946); Hadamar Trial, 1 L. Rep. Trials War Crim. 46 (U.S. Mil. Comm'n-
Wiesbaden 1945); In re Eisentrager, 14 L. Rep. Trial War Crim. 8 (U.S. Mil. Comm'n-
Shanghai 1947)); see also RATNER & ABRAMs, supra note 22, at 143; Amnesty Interna-
tional, supra note 5, sec. II.B; Willard B. Cowles, Trials of War Criminals (Non-Nurem-
berg), 42 AM. J. INT'L L. 299, 309-13 (1948) (discussing the Hadamar case and its
application of extraterritorial jurisdiction based on universality).
52. See Amnesty International, supra note 5, sec. II.B; see also Damrosch, supra note
32, at 219.
53. See Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide,
adopted Dec. 9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277 [hereinafter Genocide Convention]. Lyal Sunga
noted that a Holocaust survivor, Raphael Lemkin, invented the term "genocide" and
lobbied States to create and adopt a convention prohibiting conduct within its meaning.
See LYAL S. SUNGA, INDIVIDUAL RESPONSIBILITY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW FOR SERIOUS HUMAN
RIGHTS VIOLATIONS 65 n.2 (1992).
54. See SUNGA, supra note 53, at 65.
55. See Genocide Convention, supra note 53, art. I.
56. Id. art. II. The ICC Statute includes genocide in its catalog of crimes and uses a
definition identical to the Convention's definition. See ICC Statute, supra note 34, art. 6.
Also, the 1993 Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia
and the 1994 Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda contain the
same listing of acts constituting genocide. See ICTY Report, supra note 36, art. 4, para.
46, at 12; ICTR Statute, supra note 38, art. 2.
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In addition to this conventional foundation, the prohibition of the crime of
genocide is also part of customary international law.57
While the prohibition of genocide is widely accepted, the extension of
universal jurisdiction over this offense is less certain.58 This uncertainty
probably derives from the text of the Genocide Convention itself. With
respect to national prosecutions under the Convention, Article VI states
that alleged perpetrators of genocide "shall be tried by a competent tribu-
nal of the State in the territory of which the act was committed."5 9 In other
words, Article VI of the Genocide Convention provides for jurisdiction
based on territoriality. 60
It has been argued, however, that while the Convention provides for
territoriality-based prosecution, it does not preclude the possible exercise of
extraterritorial jurisdiction over the crime of genocide. Steven Ratner and
Jason Abrams, for example, noted that at the time of the Genocide Conven-
tion's drafting, "most member states appear to have interpreted the territo-
rial state's jurisdiction as non-exclusive and, in particular, did not regard
the Convention as precluding states from exercising jurisdiction based on
the nationality and passive personality principles."61 However, at the same
time, member States rejected the proposal for including universality-based
jurisdiction in the Convention.62
57. See Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the
Crime of Genocide, 1951 L.CJ. 15, 23 (May 28) ("[T]he principles underlying the Con-
vention are principles which are recognized by civilized nations as binding on States,
even without any conventional obligation."); see also ICTY Report, supra note 36, para.
45 at 12; RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 8, § 702 (listing the prohibition of genocide
as customary law); HANIKAINEN, supra note 8, at 458-66; SUNGA, supra note 53, at 73
("Evidence of opinio juris and general State practice supports the conclusion that the
rule against genocide is part of international customary law, and perhaps of jus
cogens."); Meron, supra note 40, at 558 ("Genocide is a crime under both customary law
and a treaty.").
58. See, e.g., Bowett, supra note 26, at 12. Theodor Meron intimated uncertainty that
genocide is subject to universal jurisdiction when he wrote: "jI]t is increasingly recog-
nized by leading commentators that the crime of genocide ... may also be cause for
prosecution by any state." Meron, supra note 40, at 569 (emphasis added) (footnote
omitted).
59. Genocide Convention, supra note 53, art. VI (emphasis added).
60. John Murphy wrote that "the Convention does not create a system of universal
jurisdiction." John F. Murphy, International Crimes, in 2 UInTE NATIoNs LEGAL ORDER
993, 1010 (Oscar Schachter & Christopher C. Joyner eds., 1995). On the other hand,
article I of the Genocide Convention recognizes genocide as a crime under international
law. See Genocide Convention, supra note 53, art. I. Writing about this provision's pur-
pose, as a judge of the International Court of Justice in the Case Concerning Application
of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Elihu Lauter-
pacht stated: "The purpose of this... provision is to permit parties, within the domestic
legislation that they adopt, to assume universal jurisdiction over the crime of genocide -
that is to say, even when the acts have been committed outside their respective territories
by persons who are not their nationals." Application of the Convention on the Preven-
tion and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v. Yugo.), 1993 I.CJ. 325,
443 (Sept. 13) (sep. op. Lauterpacht). For a discussion of article VI's drafting history,
see NEHEMIAH- ROBINSON, THE GENOCIDE CONVENTION: A COMMENTARY 80-86 (1960).
61. RATNER & ABRAMS, supra note 22, at 142.
62. See id.
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Kenneth Randall observed that the Genocide Convention's require-
ment that States prosecute alleged perpetrators of genocide on the basis of
territorial jurisdiction did not deprive them of their preexisting customary
right to exercise universal jurisdiction over genocide. 63 This view appears
to prevail among commentators 64 and States, a number of whom have
genocide legislation based on the universality principle of extraterritorial
jurisdiction. 65 Thus, even without any link to the offense, a State would
likely be considered acting within its authority in proceeding against an
alleged perpetrator of genocide.
3. Universal Jurisdiction over the Crime of Torture
The prohibition of torture is the subject of several conventional provi-
sions and is regarded as part of customary law. In 1948, the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights proclaimed: "No one shall be subjected to
torture .. ".."66 Since that time, the prohibition of torture has been
included in at least seven international or regional instruments. 6 7 The lat-
63. See Randall, supra note 21, at 836. The District Court of Jerusalem expressed
this view in the Eichmann case:
It is the consensus of opinion that the absence from [the Genocide] Convention
of a provision establishing the principle of universality ... is a grave defect in
the Convention, which is likely to weaken the joint effort for the prevention of
the commission of this abhorrent crime and punishment therefor, but there is
nothing in this defect to lead us to deduce any rule against the principle of universal-
ity of jurisdiction with respect to the crime in question. It is clear that the reference
in Article 6 to territorial jurisdiction .. is not exhaustive. Every sovereign State
may exercise its existing powers within the limits of customary international law,
and accession of a State to the Convention does not involve the waiving of pow-
ers which are not mentioned in Article 6. It is in conformity with this view that
the [Israeli] Law for the Prevention and Punishment of Genocide provided in
Section 5 that 'any person who has committed outside Israel an act which is an
offence under this Law may be prosecuted and punished in Israel as if he had
committed the act in Israel.'
Attorney Gen. of Isr. v. Eichmann, 36 I.L.R. 18, 38-39 (Isr. D.C. Jm. 1961) (emphasis
added) (citation omitted).
64. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (Ti-u.D), supra note 8, § 404 reporters' note 1 ("Universal
jurisdiction to punish genocide is widely accepted as a principle of customary law.");
RATNER & ABRAMS, supra note 22, at 142 ("[G]enocide likely carries universal jurisdic-
tion under customary international law."); Damrosch, supra note 32, at 216 ("[T]he
right approach.., is to view genocide as having attained the status of a crime entailing
universal jurisdiction."); Green, supra note 39, at 519; Orentlicher, supra note 3, at 705;
Randall, supra note 21, at 836-37; Ratner, supra note 40, at 254.
65. See Damrosch, supra note 32, at 216.
66. G.A. Res. 217, U.N. Doc A/RES/217 A (III), art. 5 (1948).
67. See European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, art. 3, Europ. T.S. No. 5, 213 U.N.T.S. 221, 224 [hereinafter
ECHR]; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted Dec. 19, 1966, art.
7, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, 175 [hereinafter ICCPR]; American Convention on Human Rights,
Nov. 22, 1969, art. 5(2), 9 I.L.M. 673, 676 [hereinafter ACHR]; African Charter on
Human and Peoples' Rights, June 26, 1981, art. 5, Organization of African Unity (OAU)
Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3/Rev. 5, 21 I.L.M. 59, 60 [hereinafter ACHPR]; Inter-American Con-
vention to Prevent and Punish Torture, Dec. 9, 1985, Organization of American States
T.S. No. 67, 25 I.L.M. 519; European Convention for the Prevention of Torture and Inhu-
man or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Nov. 26, 1987, Europ. T.S. No. 126, 27
I.L.M. 1153.
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est universal instrument concerned with torture is the 1984 Convention
against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Pun-
ishment, 68 a convention devoted specifically to making the universal strug-
gle against torture more effective.6 9
The Convention against Torture defines torture as
any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is
intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtaining from him
or a third person information or a confession, punishing him for an act he or
a third person has committed or is suspected of having committed, or intimi-
dating or coercing him or a third person, or for any reason based on discrim-
ination of any kind, when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the
instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or
other person acting in an official capacity.
7 0
The definition's key elements are that the act intentionally cause severe
suffering and that it have official sanction.7 1 Similarly, the customary
law's prohibition against torture7 2 likely includes these elements. 73
Some commentators suggested that the Convention against Torture
provides for the exercise of universal jurisdiction in its aut dedere aut judi-
care provision, which it shares with several modern treaties.74 The Con-
vention prescribes that a State party that does not extradite the alleged
offender establish its jurisdiction over him and the acts prohibited by the
Convention for the purpose of prosecution.75 Nevertheless, Rosalyn Hig-
gins argued that a treaty requirement to extradite or prosecute is not a
foundation for the exercise of universal jurisdiction since it only applies to
States parties that have custody of the alleged offender and lack other juris-
68. Dec. 10, 1984, 23 I.L.M. 1027 [hereinafter Convention against Torture].
69. See id. preamble, at 1027.
70. Id. art. 1(1), at 1027.
71. Manfred Nowak suggested that this definition can help give content to the prohi-
bition of torture prescribed in Article 7 of the ICCPR. See MANFRED NOWAK, U.N. COVE-
NANT ON CIVIL AN POLITICAL RIGHTS: CCPR COMMENTARY 129 (1993).
72. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 8, § 702 (listing torture as part of generally
accepted customary law). Judicial opinions of U.S. courts adhere to this view. For
example, the Ninth Circuit said: "There is no doubt that the prohibition against official
torture is a norm of customary international law...." Siderman de Blake v. Republic of
Argentina, 965 F.2d 699, 716 (9th Cir. 1992); see also, e.g., In re Estate of Marcos,
Human Rights Litigation (Hilao v. Marcos), 25 F.3d 1467, 1475 (9th Cir. 1994); In re
Estate of Marcos, Human Rights Litigation (Trajano v. Marcos), 978 F.2d 493, 499 (9th
Cir. 1992); Linder v. Portocarrero, 963 F.2d 332, 336 (11th Cir. 1992); Filartiga v. Pena-
Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 885 (2d Cir. 1980).
The Restatement (Third) notes that the prohibition of official torture is enshrined in
the constitutions and laws of many States and thus may also constitute "a general princi-
ple [of law] common to major legal systems." RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 8, § 702
reporters' note 5.
73. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 8, § 702 reporters' note 5 (linking prohibi-
tion of torture to state policy).
74. See, e.g., RESTATEMiENT (THIRD), supra note 8, § 404 reporters' note 1 ("The Con-
vention ... in effect provides for universal jurisdiction."); RATNER & ABRAMS, supra note
22, at 144-45; Osofsky, supra note 26, at 197.
75. See Convention against Torture, supra note 68, arts. 5(2), 7(1).
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dictional bases.76
Schachter considered the relationship of treaty-based aut dedere aut
judicare provisions to the recognition of universal jurisdiction and offered
two possible views. 77 One is that the States parties recognize that "univer-
sal jurisdiction exists for the crime in question and consequently States
may oblige themselves to exercise it."78 If so, then States not party to the
treaty would not be bound by the duty to exercise jurisdiction over the
offense, but would be free to do so on the theory that universality is a
recognized jurisdictional basis for the offense. 79 The other possibility is
that the duty to prosecute or extradite is merely an "advance waiver[ ] of
jurisdictional claims among the parties," that is, in other words, an agree-
ment among the States parties not to object to any State party's exercise of
jurisdiction under the treaty.80 If the aut dedere aut judicare provision in
the treaty is only an advance waiver among the parties to the treaty, it says
little about the existence of universal jurisdiction for the given offense and
would not validate a non-party's exercise of jurisdiction on the basis of
universality.
Whichever view is correct with respect to the aut dedere aut judicare
provision of the Convention against Torture, it is clear that at least any
State party to the Convention may exercise jurisdiction over an alleged per-
petrator of torture whether or not that State has any link to the offense, and
no other State party can be heard to complain about this jurisdictional
exercise. Accordingly, under the Convention, a State party may exercise
universal jurisdiction over torture, at least as far as other States parties to
the Convention are concerned.81 As the Restatement (Third) recognized,
however, universal jurisdiction founded upon "punish or extradite" provi-
sions of treaties is "effective only among the parties, unless customary law
comes to accept these offenses as subject to universal jurisdiction, '82 and
the Restatement (Third) did not list torture among the offenses subject to
universal jurisdiction as a matter of customary law.83 Consequently, exer-
cise of universal jurisdiction over torture by a State not party to the Con-
vention or against the interests of a State not party to the Convention
76. See HIGGINS, supra note 19, at 64-65.
77. See SCHACHTER, supra note 12, at 268.
78. Id.
79. See id.
80. Id.
81. For example, the U.S. implementing legislation for the Convention provides for
extraterritorial jurisdiction where "(1) the alleged offender is a national of the United
States; or (2) the alleged offender is present in the United States, irrespective of the
nationality of the victim or the alleged offender." 18 U.S.C. 2340A (1999) (emphasis
added). While this discussion focused on the Convention against Torture, any binding
aut dedere autjudicare provision of a treaty prohibiting torture would produce the same
result. Without identifying all treaties that may authorize the exercise of universal juris-
diction over torture, it suffices for present purposes to establish the effects of the alt
dedere autjudicare provision of one relevant treaty and note that the same analysis would
apply to any identical provision.
82. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 8, § 404 reporters' note 1.
83. See id. § 404 & cmt. a.
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would have uncertain validity.84
4. Concluding Observations About the Validity of the Exercise of Universal
Jurisdiction
The foregoing discussion shows that a State could exercise valid extra-
territorial jurisdiction based on the universality principle as a matter of
customary law over crimes against humanity 85 and genocide.8 6 However,
with respect to torture, it is not evident that the exercise of universal juris-
diction has been recognized by States as valid outside the context of the
Convention against Torture or another applicable treaty.8 7 Therefore, a
State may only exercise universality-based extraterritorial jurisdiction over
torture if it is a party to the Convention against Torture and only against
the jurisdictional interests of other States parties to the Convention.
Answering the question of validity of universal jurisdiction over a
given offense solves the first part of the issue addressed in this Article, that
is whether States with no connection to the given offense may prosecute an
alleged offender despite the fact that he may be the beneficiary of an
amnesty measure in the State where the offense was allegedly perpetrated.
The second part of the issue concerns the domestic amnesty measure's
validity under international law.
11. The Validity of a Domestic Amnesty Under International Human
Rights Law
The validity of an amnesty measure under international law88
depends on whether the measure extends to offenses for which convention
or custom requires prosecution. 9 A domestic amnesty measure cannot
disable prosecution of an alleged offender in another State for conduct that
must be prosecuted under international law. This Section examines
whether international law requires prosecution for the crimes discussed
with reference to universal jurisdiction, namely crimes against humanity,
genocide, and torture.
84. Although, some commentators suggest that customary law permits all States to
exercise universal jurisdiction over torture. See RATNER & ABRAms, supra note 22, at 145;
Randall, supra note 21, at 790-91; Ratner, supra note 40, at 255.
85. See supra Part II.B.1.
86. See supra Part II.B.2.
87. See supra Part II.B.3.
88. See Diane F. Orentlicher, Settling Accounts: The Duty to Prosecute Human Rights
Violations of a Prior Regime, 100 YALE LJ. 2537, 2553 (1991) (noting that "an amnesty
law or an exercise of prosecutorial discretion that is valid under domestic law may none-
theless breach a state's international obligations").
89. See Christopher C. Joyner, Redressing Impunity for Human Rights Violations: The
Universal Declaration and the Search for Accountability, 26 DENy. J. Irr'L L. & Pol'v 591,
613 (1998) (noting that "It]he duty to prosecute certain grave human rights violations,
derived from international criminal law, clearly implies that criminal acts subject to
such a duty cannot at least in principle be amnestied"); see also Michael P. Scharf, Swap-
ping Amnesty for Peace: Was There a Duty to Prosecute International Crimes in Haiti?, 31
TEx. INT'L LJ. 1, 19 (1996) ("The prerogative of a state to issue an amnesty for an offense
can be circumscribed by treaties to which the state is a party.").
.es..ta.'8s *~hP 4.SMD
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A. Amnesty over Crimes Against Humanity
Crimes against humanity, unlike genocide or torture, are not the sub-
ject of a specialized convention compelling States to take particular
action. 90 Consequently, any duty to prosecute alleged offenders of crimes
against humanity must be based on custom. Commentators like M. Cherif
Bassiouni and Diane Orentlicher have argued that customary international
law includes the duty to prosecute alleged perpetrators of crimes against
humanity.9 1 Other commentators like Michael Scharf argue that since
State practice is hardly uniform, it could not be said that the duty to prose-
cute the alleged offenders exists as a matter of customary international
law.9 2
Proponents of the duty to prosecute alleged perpetrators of crimes
against humanity ground their conclusion in the existence of several U.N.
General Assembly resolutions and a few international conventions and
declarations. 93 Nevertheless, none of these documents creates a binding
obligation on States to prosecute alleged perpetrators of crimes against
humanity.94 As an example, the proponents 95 point to the International
Law Commission's Principles of International Law Recognized in the Char-
ter of the Ntirnberg Tribunal and in the Judgement of the Tribunal that
provide as the first Principle: "Any person who commits an act which con-
stitutes a crime under international law is responsible therefor and liable to
punishment."96 The sixth Principle identifies crimes against humanity as
crimes under international law.97 On their face, these provisions suggest
the existence of personal criminal liability for crimes against humanity and
perhaps allow for an exercise of universal jurisdiction over such crimes.
Yet, the Principles do not speak of, much less create, a duty for States to
prosecute alleged perpetrators of crimes against humanity.98 On this
point, Orentlicher stated:
Despite this focus [on permissive international jurisdiction], the law is fairly
interpreted to require, and not merely to authorize, states to punish crimes
against humanity when committed in their own jurisdiction. Correctly
understood, the emphasis on permissive international jurisdiction signifies
90. See generally Bassiouni, supra note 36.
91. See id. at 480-81; Orentlicher, supra note 88, at 2593-94; see also Carla
Edelenbos, Human Rights Violations: A Duty to Prosecute?, 7 LEIDEN J. INT'L L. No. 2,
Autumn 1994, at 5, 15-16.
92. See Michael Scharf, The Letter of the Law: The Scope of the International Legal
Obligation to Prosecute Human Rights Crimes, 59 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBs. No. 4, Autumn
1996, at 41, 59; Scharf, supra note 89, at 38-39.
93. See, e.g., Bassiouni, supra note 36, at 480-81; Orentficher, supra note 88, at 2593-
94.
94. See Scharf, supra note 92, at 52-59; Scharf, supra note 89, at 35-39.
95. See Orentlicher, supra note 88, at 2593 n.248.
96. U.N. GAOR, 5th Sess., Supp. No. 12, at 11, U.N. Doc. A/1316 (1950).
97. See id. at 14.
98. While Orenticher seems to have acknowledged as much, she pointed out that
Ferencz understood these Principles to "'confirm(] that international law required
international crimes to be punished.'" Orenticher, supra note 88, at 2593 n.248 (quot-
ing 2 B. FERENCz, AN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 22 (1980)).
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the strength of international law's insistence that crimes against humanity
must be punished .... 99
Nevertheless, another interpretation of permissive international juris-
diction is that an exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction over crimes
against humanity is deemed valid in international law without creating a
duty to prosecute for the State where the offense was perpetrated. 10 0
A much clearer recognition of States' obligation to prosecute alleged
offenders of crimes against humanity is contained in the 1971 U.N. Gen-
eral Assembly resolution on the question of the punishment of war
criminals and of persons who have committed crimes against humanity' 1
and the 1973 U.N. General Assembly resolution on principles of interna-
tional cooperation in the detection, arrest, extradition and punishment of
persons guilty of war crimes and crimes against humanity. 10 2 In the 1971
resolution, the General Assembly urged States "to ensure the punishment
of all persons guilty of [war crimes and crimes against humanity]."'10 3 The
1973 resolution set out as a principle of international cooperation that
"[w]ar crimes and crimes against humanity, wherever they are committed,
shall be subject to investigation and the persons against whom there is
evidence that they have committed such crimes shall be subject to tracing,
arrest, trial and, if found guilty, to punishment."10 4 Although the latter
provision seems to use permissive terms,10 5 the 1971 resolution unam-
biguously "urges" States to ensure that perpetrators of crimes against
humanity are punished.' 0 6 The trouble with relying on these General
Assembly resolutions to support a State duty to prosecute alleged perpetra-
tors of crimes against humanity is that the resolutions are not binding on
States.
Also relevant to ascertaining the duty of States to prosecute crimes
against humanity are two treaties intended to bind States parties: the 1968
Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitations to War
Crimes and Crimes against Humanity1 0 7 and the 1974 European Conven-
99. Id. at 2593.
100. For example, instead of reading the Nuremberg Principles as saying that there is
universal jurisdiction over crimes against humanity and the State where the offense took
place has a duty to prosecute, they may be read (more faithfully, it seems) to say only that
there is universal jurisdiction over such crimes.
101. G.A. Res. 2840, U.N. GAOR, 26th Sess., Supp. No. 29, at 88, U.N. Doc. A/8429
(1971).
102. G.A. Res. 3074, U.N. GAOR, 28th Sess., Supp. No. 30, at 78, U.N. Doc. A/9030
(1973).
103. G.A. Res. 2840, supra note 101, para. 1.
104. G.A. Res. 3074, supra note 102, para. 1.
105. The provision can be read to say that alleged offenders shall be subject to prose-
cution and any State may prosecute them, rather than saying that States must prosecute
them. When the Resolution's drafters wished to suggest a State obligation (albeit a non-
binding one, since General Assembly resolutions are not binding), they dearly said
"States shall .. " E.g., G.A. Res. 3074, supra note 102, paras. 3 ("States shall co-oper-
ate.... ."), 4 ("States shall assist . ), 6 ("States shall co-operate .. "), 7 ("States shall
not . . . ."), 8 ("States shall not .. ), 9 ("States shall act ... .
106. See supra text accompanying note 103.
107. Adopted Nov. 26, 1968, 754 U.N.T.S. 73.
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tion on the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitations to Crimes Against
Humanity and War Crimes.' 0 8 These Conventions prescribe that States
parties shall not apply any statutory limitation to crimes against human-
ity.10 9 While these instruments do not obligate States parties to prosecute
alleged offenders of crimes against humanity, they evince a conviction
among States parties that perpetrators of such crimes should not escape
punishment. 110 Even if read in this light, however, the effect of these
instruments on ascertaining the duty of States to prosecute crimes against
humanity is diminished by the fact that the first instrument is not widely
adopted"'I and the second instrument is not yet in force, having only four
signatories and one ratification. 1 2 Nevertheless, it should be noted that
the preamble to the recently adopted Statute of the International Criminal
Court, which includes crimes against humanity in the Court's subject-mat-
ter jurisdiction, 13 proclaims that "it is the duty of every State to exercise
its criminal jurisdiction over those responsible for international
crimes."114
In sum, no binding instrument prescribes a State duty to prosecute
alleged perpetrators of crimes against humanity. The materials suggesting
a duty to prosecute show, at best, that there exists among States opiniojuris
sufficient to create a custom. Of course, international customary law is
created only when opinio juris is shown to exist and such opinio stands
alongside the uniform practice of States."15 It must be considered whether
the practice of States regarding the duty to prosecute crimes against
humanity could be regarded as sufficiently uniform to sustain the claim
that custom exists.
Scharf reviewed the practice of States with respect to prosecutions for
crimes against humanity and found that "[t]o the extent any state practice
in this area is widespread, it is the practice of granting amnesties or de
facto impunity to those who commit crimes against humanity."' 1 6 Propo-
108. Opened for signature Jan. 25, 1974, Europ. T.S. No. 82, 13 I.L.M. 540.
109. See id. art. 1 at 540; Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limita-
tions to War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity, supra note 107, arts. I(b), IV, at 75,
76.
110. See Orentlicher, supra note 88, at 2594.
111. As of December 31, 1997, the Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutory
Limitations to War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity had 43 States parties. See
UNITED NATIONS, MULTLATERAL TREvr~as DEPOSITED WITH THE SECRETARY-GENERAL 165
(1998).
112. This treaty requires three ratifications before taking effect; as of April 9, 2000, it
had only two ratifications (the Netherlands and Romania) and two other signatories
(France and Belgium). See Council of Europe, Chart of Signatures and Ratifications
of a Treaty (visited Sept. 4, 2000) <http://conventions.coe.int/treaty/EN/cadreprincipal.
htm>.
113. See ICC Statute, supra note 34, art. 7.
114. ICC Statute, supra note 34, preamble, para. 6. Of course, the ICC Statute only
has three out of the 60 ratifications necessary to become effective, and, in any event, it
does not create an obligation for States to prosecute alleged offenders of any crimes
included in it. Nevertheless, it is another, more recent, demonstration of the importance
that the international community attaches to prosecuting crimes against humanity.
115. See, e.g., BROWNLIE, supra note 25, at 4-11.
116. Scharf, supra note 92, at 57; see Scharf, supra note 89, at 36.
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nents of the existence of the duty to prosecute crimes against humanity
sometimes concede that "in practice prosecution does not always
occur,"
1 1 7 but they propose that
[i]n the light of the existing treaties, declarations and the practice with
regard to war crimes and crimes against humanity committed during the
Second World War, one can conclude that the international community of
states has accepted the obligation to prosecute those suspected of having
committed war crimes and crimes against humanity .... 1 18
With amnesties granted or impunity otherwise condoned in several
relatively recent cases where crimes against humanity prosecutions would
seem warranted,119 the practice of State prosecutions probably cannot be
regarded as sufficiently uniform to support the claim that customary law
exists as to the States' duty to prosecute crimes against humanity.
While customary international law presently does not require States
to prosecute alleged perpetrators of crimes against humanity, human rights
law contains treaty obligations for States to ensure that people within their
jurisdictions enjoy fundamental rights, such as the right to life, freedom
from torture, and freedom from arbitrary detention and arrest.120 Human
rights law thus prohibits many of the offenses considered within the ambit
of crimes against humanity, even when their commission is limited to a
single instance. Moreover, the duty "to ensure" fundamental rights has
been generally interpreted to mean "that states are obliged to take specific
steps to redress the wrong committed by each violation of a right."121
The bodies charged with supervising implementation of the treaty pro-
visions, like the U.N. Human Rights Committee and the Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights, have stated that blanket amnesty laws and
similar impunity measures are inconsistent with States parties' obligations
to ensure the enjoyment of human rights, including the right to an effective
117. Edelenbos, supra note 91, at 16.
118. Id. at 15.
119. See supra notes 2-3 and accompanying text (noting situations where amnesties
were granted); see also Joyner, supra note 89, at 593 (noting that despite the fact that at
least 220 non-international conflicts generating about 86 million deaths have taken
place since World War II, "there have been relatively few prosecutions and only scarce
accountability"); Scharf, supra note 92, at 57-59; Scharf, supra note 89, at 36-37 (noting
several instances where amnesties rather than indictments were issued, including cases
with the support of the United Nations, for example Cambodia, South Africa, and Haiti).
120. See, e.g., ICCPR, supra note 67, arts. 2(1) (duty to respect and to ensure recog-
nized rights), 6 (right to life), 7 (freedom from torture), 9 (freedom from arbitrary arrest
or detention); ACHPR, supra note 67, arts. 25 (duty to promote, respect, and ensure
recognized rights), 4 (right to life), 5 (freedom from torture), 6 (freedom from arbitrary
arrest or detention); ACHR, supra note 67, arts. 1 (duty to respect and to ensure recog-
nized rights), 4 (right to life), 5(2) (freedom from torture), 7(3) (freedom from arbitrary
arrest or detention); ECHR, supra note 67, arts. 1 (duty to secure human rights), 2 (right
to life), 3 (prohibition of torture), 5 (right to liberty and security).
121. Juan E. M~ndez, Accountability for Past Abuses, 19 HuM. RTs. Q. 255, 259 (1997);
see Naomi Roht-Arriaza, State Responsibility to Investigate and Prosecute Grave Human
Rights Violations in International Law, 78 CAL. L. REv. 451, 467-83 (1990).
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remedy. 122 Thus, while these instruments do not expressly create a duty
for States parties to prosecute alleged perpetrators of human rights viola-
tions,123 the treaties have been interpreted to preclude grants of absolute
impunity with respect to breaches of the rights enumerated in them. Devel-
opments in the treaty bodies suggest that the States parties' duty to ensure
fundamental rights has flowered into a minimum obligation to investigate
the violation and leave open possible prosecution of alleged
perpetrators. 12
4
Still, human rights law under the treaties has not developed to the
point where prosecution of alleged perpetrators would be required for
human rights violations that constitute component offenses of crimes
against humanity. Thus, neither treaty-based human rights law nor inter-
national customary law entails a legal duty to prosecute crimes against
humanity. Nevertheless, States parties to the general human rights conven-
tions may well be precluded from exercising their prerogative to grant
amnesties given the treaty bodies' interpretation of the duty to ensure the
enjoyment of human rights.
122. See Edelenbos, supra note 91, at 8 (referring to statements of these bodies in
cases involving torture and disappearance); M~ndez, supra note 121, at 259 n.11 (refer-
ring to Comments of the Human Rights Committee, in 1995 and 1996, on periodic reports
submitted by Argentina and Peru, respectively); Orentlicher, supra note 88, at 2561
("[Blodies that monitor compliance with several human rights treaties that are textually
silent about punishment have made clear that investigation and prosecution play a nec-
essary part in States Parties' fulfillment of certain duties under the conventions.");
Scharf, supra note 92, at 51 (noting that the Inter-American Commission on Human
Rights determined that amnesties were incompatible with the obligations of States par-
ties to ensure protection of ACHR rights); Robert 0. Weiner, Trying to Make Ends Meet:
Reconciling the Law and Practice of Human Rights Amnesties, 26 ST. MARY's L.J. 857, 867
(1995) (same).
123. Orentlicher noted that the proposal to include in the ICCPR the duty to prose-
cute violators of the rights contained in that Covenant "was rejected without significant
discussion" during the drafting of the instrument. Orentlicher, supra note 88, at 2569-
70; see also Scharf, supra note 89, at 25 (noting that the ICCPR and the ACHR "are silent
about a duty to punish violations of the rights they were designed to protect"). However,
Orentlicher observed that while the duty to prosecute was not provided for in the text of
the Covenant, "nothing in the drafting history is inconsistent with such a duty." Oren-
tlicher, supra note 88, at 2571.
124. See, e.g., Naomi Roht-Arriaza, Combating Impunity: Some Thoughts on the Way
Forward, 59 LAw & CorTEmp. PROBS. No. 4, Autumn 1996, at 93.
In addition to a growing domestic court practice, international bodies continue
to clarify the extent of a state's international law obligations to investigate, pros-
ecute, and compensate victims of international crimes and serious human rights
violations. The general tenor has been to reaffirm and expand on duties to
investigate, prosecute, and compensate, and to be critical of amnesties that pre-
clude any of these things.
Id. at 95; see also Scharf, supra note 92, at 48-52. In 1997, Juan MEndez identified the
following as "emerging principles": "1. to investigate, prosecute, and punish the perpe-
trators; 2. to disclose to the victims, their families, and society all that can be reliably
established about those events; 3. to offer the victims adequate reparations; and 4. to
separate known perpetrators from law enforcement bodies and other positions of
authority." M~ndez, supra note 121, at 261. M~ndez noted that referring to these prin-
ciples as "'emerging principles' and not as binding international law obligations signi-
fies their present status: only in part do they find justification in existing norms of
universal applicability." Id.
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B. Amnesty over the Crime of Genocide
The crime of genocide is the subject of a specialized convention that
compels States parties to prosecute persons responsible for committing
acts of genocide in their territory. The Genocide Convention provides that
"[p]ersons committing genocide.., shall be punished,"' 25 that "[t]he Con-
tracting Parties undertake to enact . . . the necessary legislation to give
effect to the provisions of the... Convention and, in particular, to provide
effective penalties for persons guilty of genocide,"' 2 6 and, specifically, that
"[p]ersons charged with genocide.., shall be tried by a competent tribunal
of the State in the territory of which the act was committed."12 7 Thus, it is
clear that under the Genocide Convention, States parties are bound to
prosecute and punish persons charged with committing genocide in their
territory.128 Although the Convention is widely adopted, with 124 States
parties, 12 9 it is not universally accepted, and "no person has been prose-
cuted in accordance with its terms." 130
The question then arises whether the duty to prosecute alleged perpe-
trators of genocide exists in customary international law apart from the
Genocide Convention. The Restatement (Third) sets out that "[a] state vio-
lates customary law if it practices or encourages genocide, fails to make
genocide a crime or to punish persons guilty of it, or otherwise condones
genocide."' 3 1 Thus, the Restatement (Third) identifies the duty to prose-
cute alleged perpetrators of genocide as part of customary law, although it
does not elucidate how the reporters arrived at this conclusion.
Orentlicher wrote that "there is substantial support for the view that
customary law requires states to prosecute acts of genocide committed in
their territory."'132 To support this proposition, she referred to the Advi-
sory Opinion of the International Court of Justice on Reservations to the
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide'3 3
and the Restatement (Third).13 4 In the relevant part of the Advisory Opin-
ion, the International Court stated that the principles underlying the Geno-
cide Convention "are recognized by civilized nations as binding on States,
even without any conventional obligation."135 Orentlicher argued that
125. Genocide Convention, supra note 53, art. IV, at 280.
126. Id. art. V, at 280.
127. Id. art. VI, at 280-82.
128. This conclusion is the universally accepted view among commentators. See, e.g.,
ROBINSON, supra note 60, at 84; Joyner, supra note 89, at 603-04; Orentlicher, supra note
88, at 2564-65.
129. See UNiED NATIONS, supra note 111, at 84 (information current as of December
31, 1997).
130. Murphy, supra note 60, at 1011.
131. RESTATEMEw (THIRD), supra note 8, § 702 cmt. d (emphasis added).
132. Orentlicher, supra note 88, at 2565. But see Ramer, supra note 40, at 254
("[C]ustomary international law clearly recognizes the right (though not the duty) of a
state to prosecute for genocide committed anywhere." (emphasis added)).
133. 1951 L.CJ. 15 (May 28).
134. See Orentlicher, supra note 88, at 2565-66.
135. Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime
of Genocide, 1951 L.CJ. at 23.
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although the International Court did not expressly establish the duty to
prosecute genocide as one of the customary principles underlying the Con-
vention, it is "surely" included in the International Court's understanding
of customary law's content with respect to genocide since the duty to pros-
ecute is central to the Convention. 13 6 On the other hand, no State practice
seems to shore up the view that customary law includes the duty of States
to prosecute alleged perpetrators of genocide committed in their territory.
Therefore, although the customary duty to prosecute may be less than
clear, States parties to the Genocide Convention have accepted the obliga-
tion to prosecute genocide perpetrated in their territory, and a grant of
amnesty for genocide would be clearly contrary to the Convention's
requirements.
C. Amnesty over the Crime of Torture
The prohibition of torture is part of several international and regional
instruments, 137 including the Convention against Torture. 138 The Conven-
tion against Torture enumerates duties States parties have with respect to
combating torture, including taking "effective legislative, administrative,
judicial or other measures to prevent acts of torture in any territory under
its jurisdiction," 13 9 ensuring "that all acts of torture are offences under its
criminal law . . . punishable by appropriate penalties which take into
account their grave nature,"140 and taking necessary measures "to estab-
lish its jurisdiction" over torture.14 1 Moreover, by acceding to the Conven-
tion, each State party bound itself to take into custody an alleged
perpetrator of torture committed within its territory,14 2 to investigate the
facts of the alleged offense, 14 3 and to "submit the case to its competent
authorities for the purpose of prosecution" unless it extradites the offender
for prosecution elsewhere. 144
Orentlicher found that "[tlhe explicit duty to institute criminal pro-
ceedings against alleged torturers precludes adherents to the Convention
Against Torture from enacting, or at least applying, an amnesty law that
forecloses prosecution of torturers." 145 On the other hand, Christopher
Joyner considered the language of the Convention somewhat weak with
respect to requiring criminal prosecution of alleged perpetrators of torture.
He lamented that, compared to the Genocide Convention, the Convention
against Torture "fails explicitly to mandate that prosecution must occur for
136. See Orentlicher, supra note 88, at 2565. Carla Edelenbos adopted Orentlicher's
view on this matter. See Edelenbos, supra note 91, at 6-7.
137. See supra note 67 and accompanying text (citing the instruments).
138. See supra note 68.
139. Convention against Torture, supra note 68, art. 2(1), at 1028.
140. Id. art. 4(1)-(2), at 1028.
141. Id. art. 5(1), at 1028.
142. See id. art. 6(1), at 1029.
143. See id. art. 6(2), at 1029.
144. Id. art. 7(1), at 1029.
145. Orendicher, supra note 88, at 2567.
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all alleged cases of torture."146 The provision underlying this critique 14 7 is
Article 7(1) of the Convention that requires States parties to "submit" cases
to prosecution 148 rather than, as the Genocide Convention mandates, to
try and punish offenders. 149 Scharf dismissed such criticism, arguing that
the more careful language of the Convention results from the drafters'
desire "to avoid the suggestion of a predetermined outcome of the judicial
proceedings," rather than reflecting any notion that prosecution under the
Convention against Torture would not be required. 5 0
The Convention against Torture requires States parties to investigate,
prosecute, and punish instances of torture perpetrated in their territory.
Granting a blanket amnesty that precludes taking these steps to combat
torture would likely be inconsistent with the States parties' obligations
under the Convention. 15 1 This inconsistency would also exist under the
prohibition of torture set out in the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights (ICCPR).' 52 Although the ICCPR does not explicitly
require prosecution of alleged perpetrators of torture,15 3 the U.N. Human
Rights Committee stated in its first General Comment on the Covenant's
prohibition of torture that
it is not sufficient for the implementation of this article to prohibit such
treatment or punishment or to make it a crime. Most States have penal pro-
visions which are applicable to cases of torture or similar practices. Because
such cases nevertheless occur, it follows from article 7, read together with
article 2 of the Covenant, that States must ensure an effective protection
through some machinery of control.
Complaints about ill-treatment must be investigated effectively by competent
authorities. Those found guilty must be held responsible .... 15 4
This comment makes clear the Committee's stance that persons guilty
of having committed torture must be held responsible. 155 Moreover, in
1992, the Committee issued its second General Comment concerning the
prohibition of torture with which it meant to further develop its first Com-
146. Joyner, supra note 89, at 606.
147. See id.
148. Convention against Torture, supra note 68, art. 7(1), at 1029.
149. See Genocide Convention, supra note 53, arts. IV, VI, at 280-82.
150. Scharf, supra note 89, at 24.
151. While a blanket amnesty would seem incompatible with the States parties' obli-
gations under the Convention, Orentlicher suggested that "a State Party might [neverthe-
less] be allowed to enact a statute of limitations covering prosecutions for torture,
provided the torture did not constitute a crime against humanity." Orentlicher, supra
note 88, at 2567 n.126.
152. See ICCPR, supra note 67, art. 7, at 175 (prohibition of torture).
153. See supra note 123 and accompanying text.
154. United Nations Human Rights Committee, General Comment 7, Torture or Cruel,
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (Article 7) para. 1, note (writtenJuly 30,
1982) <http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/>.
155. See Orentlicher, supra note 88, at 2572. However, Orentlicher acknowledged
that it is not clear that the Committee's opinion that torturers must be held responsible
necessarily means that they must be held criminally responsible. See id. at 2573.
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ment. 15 6 In the latter Comment, the Committee noted that some States
have amnestied acts of torture and said: "Amnesties are generally incompati-
ble with the duty of States to investigate such acts; to guarantee freedom
from such acts within their jurisdiction; and to ensure that they do not
occur in the future."15 7
While the Committee's views strongly suggest that amnesties covering
torture would be incompatible with States parties' obligations under the
Covenant, Scharf observed that the Committee qualified this view by say-
ing this incompatibility would be true generally, which could be read to
mean that not every case of amnesty would be at odds with the State's duty
to ensure freedom from torture. 158 In any event, it seems likely a blanket
amnesty measure that precludes any accountability of perpetrators of tor-
ture would meet with the Committee's disapproval. 159 Blanket amnesty
measures have also been held to violate the American Convention on
Human Rights. 160 Thus, the relevant conventions seem to preclude a State
party from lawfully granting broad amnesty measures that would allow
absolute impunity with respect to acts of torture.
It remains to be considered whether customary international law
extends this prohibition of blanket amnesties for torture to situations the
conventional law does not reach. The Restatement (Third) implies that a
government that takes "no steps" to prevent repeated or notorious acts of
torture or to punish the perpetrators violates customary law.16 1 The view
that States have a customary duty to punish torturers has also been sup-
ported 16 2 by dictum from a decision of the Committee Against Torture, the
body established to monitor implementation of the Convention against Tor-
ture and review alleged breaches. 16 3 The Committee Against Torture
stated that "even before the entry into force of the Convention against Tor-
ture, there existed a general rule of international law which should oblige
all States to take effective measures to prevent torture and to punish acts of
156. See United Nations Human Rights Committee, General Comment 20, Replaces
General Comment 7 Concerning Prohibition of Torture and Cruel Treatment or Punishment
(Article 7) para. 1 (written Apr. 10, 1992) <http://www.unhchr.ch.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/>.
157. Id. para. 15 (emphasis added).
158. See Scharf, supra note 89, at 27.
159. Scharf suggested that an amnesty measure with provisions for investigation,
removal of the perpetrators from positions of authority, and victim compensation would
be acceptable under the Committee's view. See Id.
160. See, e.g., Edelenbos, supra note 91, at 9-10 (noting cases); Scharf, supra note 89,
at 28 (same).
161. See RESTATEMENT (THiRn), supra note 8, § 702 cmt. b. This view is apparent from
the fact that paragraph 702(d) lists the prohibition of torture as part of customary law
and comment b states that "violations of human rights cited in this section . . . are
violations of customary international law only if practiced, encouraged, or condoned by
the government of a state as official policy." Id. Comment b further states that "[a]
government may be presumed to have encouraged or condoned acts prohibited by this
section if such acts.., have been repeated or notorious and no steps have been taken to
prevent them or to punish the perpetrators." Id.
162. See, e.g., Edelenbos, supra note 91, at 8.
163. On the functions of the Committee, see Convention against Torture, supra note
68, arts. 17-24, at 1031-36.
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torture."'164 Nevertheless, Scharf warned that this dictum "should not be
mistakenly construed as suggesting that amnesties for persons who com-
mit torture are invalid under customary international law."165 Scharfs
view stems from the Committee's use of the word "should," indicative of an
aspiration, rather than a statement of a duty.166
However one reads this dictum, it does not change the fact that
although the Restatement (Third) suggests that States are under a custom-
ary duty, at least, to take steps to punish perpetrators of repeated or notori-
ous acts of torture, 167 it is difficult to identify any State practice supporting
the existence of such a duty in custom.16 8 It must be noted also that the
Restatement (Third) refers to a customary duty to punish acts of torture,
but not to a duty to prosecute alleged offenders. This formulation would
seem to allow punishment of offenders by means other than the criminal
process, such as dismissing them from positions of authority. In any event,
as in the case of genocide, the customary duty of States to prosecute torture
is less clear than the conventional obligation of States parties not to pre-
clude accountability of perpetrators of torture by domestic amnesty
measures.
D. Concluding Observations About the Validity of Domestic Amnesties
Although the customary duty of States to prosecute alleged perpetra-
tors of crimes against humanity, genocide, and torture is not clearly estab-
lished in international law, the relevant conventional instruments impose
on States parties duties that the granting of amnesties with respect to those
offenses would breach. 169 For example, conventions like the Genocide
Convention, the Convention against Torture, and the ICCPR may properly
be read to preclude States parties from mandating impunity over crimes
against humanity, genocide, and torture.
Amnesties granted by States in violation of their conventional duties
cannot be considered valid on the international plane and cannot have any
effect on the prerogatives of other States. Consequently, such amnesties do
not extinguish the prerogative of other States to exercise their jurisdiction
over alleged perpetrators of crimes against humanity, genocide, or torture
on the basis of the universality principle. However, amnesties granted by
States that are not parties to the conventions discussed or States parties'
amnesty measures that were coupled with investigation of allegations,
imposition of some punitive measures on perpetrators, and compensation
164. Decisions of the Committee against Torture under Article 22 of the Convention
against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, in
Report of the Committee against Torture, U.N. GAOR, 45th Sess., Supp. No. 44, Annex V,
para. 7.2, U.N. Doc. A/45/44 (1990) (emphasis added).
165. Scharf, supra note 89, at 25.
166. See id.
167. See supra note 161 and accompanying text.
168. Again, the practice of States in granting amnesties covering acts of torture under-
mines the thrust of the claim that States are under a duty to prosecute torture. See supra
note 2 and accompanying text (referring to various amnesty measures).
169. See supra Parts III.A (crimes against humanity), III.B (genocide), III.C (torture).
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of victims are valid under international law.170
Thus, the question of the validity of amnesties yields two possible
answers. The question of validity of universal jurisdiction also yielded two
answers. Under customary law, any State may exercise universal jurisdic-
tion over crimes against humanity and genocide, 171 but with respect to
torture, universal jurisdiction may only be exercised in the context of the
Convention against Torture.172 It now remains to merge the possible
answers from the foregoing enquiries into a framework that can serve as
the analytical foundation for determining whether a foreign State without
any connection to the given offense may prosecute an alleged offender
despite the fact that the offender is the beneficiary of an amnesty in the
State where the offense took place.
III. Analytical Framework
Taking into account only prescriptions of international law and leav-
ing domestic law considerations aside, the analytical framework grows out
of two distinct enquiries: the validity of exercising jurisdiction and the
validity of the domestic amnesty. Since it is assumed that the foreign State
seeking to prosecute the alleged offender lacks any connection to the
offense, except possibly custody of the alleged offender, jurisdiction must
be founded on the principle of universality. 173 Theoretically, the exercise
of universal jurisdiction over a given offense could either be valid and pros-
ecution in the foreign State permissible or invalid and prosecution in that
State impermissible under international law. In the amnesty enquiry,
international law could either require prosecution, in which case the grant
of an amnesty over the given offense would be invalid, or not require prose-
cution, in which case the grant of an amnesty would be valid. The follow-
ing matrix represents these possibilities schematically.
Validity of Jurisdiction/ Prosecution Not Required = Prosecution Required
Validity of Amnesty Grant of Amnesty Valid Grant of Amnesty Not Valid
Exercise of Universal
jurisdiction Valid =
Prosecution in a Foreign
State Permitted
Exercise of Universal
Jurisdiction Not Valid =
Prosecution in a Foreign
State Not Permitted
A. Valid Jurisdiction/Invalid Amnesty
A situation where the exercise of universal jurisdiction would be valid
and international law requires prosecution presents the easy case. In that
170. See, e.g., supra notes 154-60 and accompanying text.
171. See supra notes 85-86 and accompanying text.
172. See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
173. See supra text accompanying note 6 (making this assumption); supra Part IL.B
(discussing universality as a basis for extraterritorial jurisdiction).
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situation, prosecution could proceed in the foreign State against an alleged
offender who is covered by a domestic amnesty in the State where the
offense was committed. Since international law requires prosecution for
the particular offense, the domestic amnesty need not be recognized as
valid on the international plane. Furthermore, given that universal juris-
diction is recognized as valid with respect to the offense, any State is free to
proceed against the alleged offender despite the amnesty. Genocide is an
example in this category.
Genocide is subject to universal jurisdiction in customary law,174 so
any State may exercise jurisdiction with respect to it. Furthermore, a State
party to the Genocide Convention, 175 and possibly, as a matter of custom,
every State,176 is required to prosecute alleged perpetrators of genocide
committed in their territory. Consequently, a State's grant of an amnesty
in such circumstances would be contrary to its duty to prosecute, and the
amnesty would not be recognized on the international plane.177 Thus, any
State could proceed against an alleged perpetrator of genocide despite a
domestic amnesty.
B. Valid Jurisdiction/Valid Amnesty
A more difficult situation arises when the exercise of universal juris-
diction would be valid, but prosecution is not required under international
law. Theoretically, in those circumstances, both States are competent to
act, one by exercising jurisdiction, the other by granting an amnesty, and a
clash of competence arises. Crimes against humanity are an example in
this category.
The validity of universal jurisdiction over crimes against humanity is
generally recognized, 178 so any State may exercise jurisdiction. At the
same time, customary law has not developed to the point that custom
requires States to prosecute perpetrators of crimes against humanity.17
9
As a consequence, a State may grant an amnesty with respect to crimes
against humanity, and this amnesty would be valid as a matter of interna-
tional law.180
The problem of dual competence, to exercise universal jurisdiction
and to grant amnesty, could be approached under the rule of reasonable-
ness normally applied in jurisdictional conflicts.' 8 ' The rule of reasona-
bleness suggests that even when a State could validly exercise jurisdiction
over a given matter, it should nevertheless refrain from doing so if another
174. See supra Part II.B.2.
175. See supra notes 125-28 and accompanying text.
176. See supra notes 131-36 and accompanying text.
177. See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
178. See supra notes 40-52 and accompanying text.
179. See supra notes 92-119 and accompanying text.
180. It would be a different situation if the amnesty-granting State were also a party to
a general human rights convention, like the ICCPR or the ACHR, that has been inter-
preted to preclude absolute impunity measures, or "blanket" amnesties, and the measure
granted were a blanket amnesty. See supra notes 120-24 and accompanying text.
181. See supra note 23 and accompanying text (discussing the rule of reasonableness).
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State has connections to the matter that make the first State's exercise of
jurisdiction unreasonable.' 8 2 Accordingly, when the State that wishes to
exercise universal jurisdiction over crimes against humanity lacks any con-
nection to the offense, its jurisdictional exercise may well be considered
unreasonable given the connection of the amnesty-granting State to the
offense and the validity of its grant of an amnesty. In such a case, the State
seeking to exercise universal jurisdiction over the offense should refrain
from prosecution in order to give effect to the other State's legally valid
amnesty.
This conclusion would be consistent with the principle of sovereign
equality of States,183 which implies that States pay due respect to each
other's jurisdictional rights.184 From the perspective of States' sovereign
equality, the amnesty-granting State should be able to expect that its valid
grant of amnesty will be respected by other States. Any breach of this
expectation by another State would weigh against the reasonableness of its
jurisdictional exercise under the universality theory.
As a practical matter, however, it is hard to imagine that a State wish-
ing to proceed against an alleged perpetrator of crimes against humanity
would abstain on grounds that the exercise of jurisdiction would be unrea-
sonable. 185 Schachter noted that in cases involving States with differing
political policies, "it becomes almost impossible for the courts in either
country to balance the conflicting interests in terms of what is reasona-
ble."186 Still, applying the rule of reasonableness provides a way out of the
competence clash when the political will or need to look for a way out
exists.
182. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 8, § 403(1); see also supra note 23 (listing
some of the factors considered in the "reasonableness" evaluation). It is not settled
whether the rule of reasonableness is a rule of international law or manifestation of
comity. The Restatement (Third) takes the position that it is a rule of international law.
The Restatement states:
This section states the principle of reasonableness as a rule of international law.
The principle applies regardless of the status of relations between the state exer-
cising jurisdiction and another state whose interests may be affected. While the
term "comity" is sometimes understood to include a requirement of reciprocity,
the rule of this section is not conditional on a finding that the state affected by a
regulation would exercise or limit its jurisdiction in the same circumstances to
the same extent.
REsTATEMENT (THiR1), supra note 8, § 403 cmt. a. Commentators take a more guarded
approach, though they support the rule. See, e.g., CAMERON, supra note 23, at 336
("Obliging state organs.., to balance interests and make only reasonable assertions of
jurisdiction, even if this cannot be said to be a requirement de lege lata, is undoubtedly a
good idea de legeferenda."); HENKIN, supra note 12, at 246 ("I believe that the principle of
reasonableness to adjust the traditional bases of jurisdiction to prescribe has arrived,
and by some name, in some guise or guises will be recognized.").
183. See, e.g., U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 1 (recognizing this principle).
184. See Bowett, supra note 26, at 15-16.
185. See CAMERON, supra note 23, at 336.
186. SCHACHTER, supra note 12, at 264.
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C. Invalid Jurisdiction/Valid Amnesty
A third situation could arise where the exercise of universal jurisdic-
tion would not be valid and the grant of an amnesty would be valid because
international law does not require prosecution for the particular offense.
This situation would exist with respect to crimes not rising to the level of
universal concern, such as common domestic offenses like murder not
committed as part of a widespread or systemic attack on a civilian popula-
tion. It is clear that in such cases, the foreign State's prosecution would be
legally unjustified.
D. Invalid Jurisdiction/Invalid Amnesty
The final scenario is a situation where the exercise of universal juris-
diction would not be valid, but prosecution is required as a matter of inter-
national law, making the amnesty invalid on the international plane. Such
a situation could arise when a State party to the Convention against Tor-
ture grants an amnesty over acts of torture and a State not party to the
Convention contemplates prosecuting the alleged torturer covered by the
amnesty.
As discussed, the Convention against Torture requires prosecution of
acts of torture.18 7 A State party to the Convention is not at liberty to grant
an amnesty over torture committed in its territory. If it does so, that
amnesty need not be recognized as valid on the international plane by
other States parties to the Convention. Pursuant to its terms and in the
context of the Convention, the other States parties may exercise jurisdic-
tion over extraterritorial acts of torture. 188 Nevertheless, this prerogative
does not extend to States that are not party to the Convention because
universality of jurisdiction over torture has not yet been established as a
matter of customary law.189 Consequently, a non-party State would not be
legally justified in proceeding against the alleged perpetrator of extraterri-
torial torture, despite the fact that the amnesty intended to shield the
accused person is invalid because of the amnesty-granting State's obliga-
tions under the Convention against Torture.
This result is unsatisfactory because it precludes States not party to
the Convention from combating impunity with respect to extraterritorial
torture. If a non-party State wished to take action against impunity over
extraterritorial torture, it could challenge the amnesty measure as a breach
of an erga omnes obligation of the amnesty-granting State.190 This course
of action may be possible because torture is prohibited in customary
law, 191 in addition to its prohibition in various conventions.' 92 Louis Hen-
kin wrote that:
187. See supra notes 137-51 and accompanying text.
188. See supra notes 74-81 and accompanying text.
189. See supra notes 82-84 and accompanying text.
190. See supra Part II.A (discussing erga omnes obligations).
191. See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
192. See supra notes 67-68 and accompanying text (noting the relevant conventions).
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Obligations of customary law in respect of human rights are erga omnes and
all states can act (by non-forcible means) to induce compliance. They can
protest, make claims, and even bring suit if the parties had consented to the
compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court ofJustice or to some rele-
vant system of arbitration. 19 3
The extent to which a non-party State could challenge an amnesty over
torture would depend, in part, on the State's ability to show that extending
an amnesty over torture amounts to dereliction of a customary duty to pre-
vent repeated or notorious acts of torture or to punish the perpetrators. 194
Persuasive views exist to buttress this argument, including the position
taken in the Restatement (Third). 19 5 However, a major determinative factor
for success in such a challenge would be the possibility of adjudicating the
claim against the amnesty-granting State, which would obviously depend
on that State's willingness to submit itself to the jurisdiction of an adjudi-
catory body.19 6
E. Concluding Comments About the Analytical Framework
These conclusions can be inserted into the proposed matrix with the
following result.
Validity of Jurisdiction/ Prosecution Not Required = Prosecution Required =
Validity of Amnesty Grant of Amnesty Valid Grant of Amnesty Not Valid
Exercise of Universal Clash of competence, Foreign state prosecution
Jurisdiction Valid = possibly apply rule of legally justified
Prosecution in a Foreign reasonableness to resolve
State Permitted
Exercise of Universal Foreign state prosecution Foreign state prosecution
Jurisdiction Not Valid = legally unjustified legally unjustified (lack of
Prosecution in a Foreign jurisdictional competence),
State Not Permitted but foreign state may
possibly challenge the
amnesty as a breach of an
erga omnes obligation to
prosecute
Although the present analytical approach is designed from the per-
spective of a foreign State that wishes to proceed against an alleged
offender, it does not consider only whether the foreign State has the capac-
ity to proceed as a matter of jurisdiction or only whether the amnesty-
granting State had the capacity to mandate impunity. Rather, this
approach considers the capacities of both States through discrete enquiries
and seeks to combine the results.
This article is not about whether domestic amnesties are good or bad
193. HENKIN, supra note 12, at 216-17 (footnote omitted).
194. See supra note 161 and accompanying text.
195. See supra notes 161-68 and accompanying text.
196. See supra notes 14-16 and accompanying text.
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as a matter of policy. 19 7 Rather, it proceeds from the recognition that,
under the current practice in negotiations for a transition of power from an
oppressive regime, an amnesty always seems to be "an option on the
table;"198 indeed, an option that is often invoked.19 9 The proposed analyt-
ical framework merely seeks to assist in evaluating the effect of a domestic
amnesty on efforts to combat impunity by prosecution in foreign States.
197. For a policy-oriented discussion on amnesties, see, for example, RATNER &
ABRAis, supra note 22, at 134-38; Garro, supra note 2, at 9-10, 22-23; Orentlicher, supra
note 88, at 2595-612.
198. Scharf, supra note 92, at 60 (quoting DavidJ. Scheffer, U.S. Ambassador-at-Large
for War Crime Issues)
199. See supra note 2 and accompanying text (naming recent amnesty measures).

